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This paper proposes a method for scheduling tariff time periods for electricity 
consumers. Europe will see a broader use of modern smart meters for electricity at 
residential consumers which must be used for enabling demand response. 
A heuristic-based method for tariff time period scheduling and pricing is proposed 
which considers different consumer groups with parameters studied a priori, taking 
advantage of demand response potential for each group and the fairness of electricity 
pricing for all consumers.  
This tool was applied to the case of Portugal, considering the actual network and 
generation costs, specific consumption profiles and overall electricity low voltage 
demand diagram. 
The proposed method achieves valid results. Its use will provide justification for the 
setting of tariff time periods by energy regulators, network operators and suppliers. 
It is also useful to estimate the consumer and electric sector benefits from changes in 
tariff time periods. 
 
Key Words: Dynamic Electricity Tariffs; Demand Response; Non-Linear 
Optimization; Heuristics. 
  





This paper is based on the research carried out in the framework of a MSc project 
(Oliveira, 2013). The internal energy market implements the three strategic vectors 
of the European energy policy (European Commission, 2010): the continuous 
availability of energy products and services at reasonable costs (through a 
competitive market and innovation in energy services); the promotion of security of 
supply on a European scale (through diversification of energy routes in supplying 
Europe and promotion of endogenous resources); and, the promotion of social and 
environmental sustainability. Moving towards 2030, the energy policy objectives 
build on the previous ones and go deeper into realizing the full potential of renewable 
generation and energy efficiency (European Commission, 2014). 
The 3rd Energy Package of European Directives includes the participation of demand 
in the electricity market and the adoption of smart meters. Directive 2009/72/CE 
(European Parliament and Council, 2009) establishes that Member-States must 
evaluate the rollout of smart energy measurement systems. These smart meters offer 
a technological leap in the relationship between consumers, networks and the 
electricity market, allowing for detailed (timely discriminated) and updated (in real 
time) knowledge concerning consumption. This data can be used by the consumer to 
manage his/her consumption; by grid operators to improve grid management and to 
involve consumers in the supply of network services; and by suppliers to develop cost 
adherent prices that promote rational options by consumers (Vasconcelos, 2008). 
European policy regards the smart meter as a tool to promote energy demand 
response which, in turn, will contribute to a competitive and efficient market, to the 
reduction of CO2 emissions and to economic growth (European Commission, 2011). 
In the Portuguese electricity market, smart meters are already being deployed by 
network operators in certain pilot projects. The trend is for them to become a 
standard solution for metering in the future. Network tariffs are approved by the 
energy regulator while energy generation costs derive from the Iberian wholesale 
market. 
 
Electricity tariffs  
Electricity tariffs paid by end-users reflect costs through the supply chain, some 
originated from regulated activities (transmission and distribution networks, costs 
related to energy policy decisions) and others from competitive market activities 
(generation costs and retail supply costs). 
Apolinário et al. (2006) presented the Portuguese additive tariff model. Tariffs for 
using the networks (also called third-party access tariffs) result from adding sub-
tariffs of each activity included in the service. In this additive model, end-user tariff 
results from adding the network tariff to generation and retail costs. 
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Houthakker (1951) and Boiteux (1960) presented two fundamental papers about 
applying marginal cost pricing to electricity. According to the authors, tariffs based 
on marginal costs produce a better distribution of resources (economic efficiency) 
and induce demand reduction at peak periods, with subsequent benefits in overall 
costs of the electricity sector. These costs include either variable generation costs, 
generation capacity costs or network infrastructure costs. 
For consumers, marginal pricing may mean a reduction in the bill, if they can adapt 
their consumption to prices (Bartusch et al., 2011) and adopt efficient technologies 
(Kim and Shcherbakova, 2011). 
For grid operators, system management costs are reduced (services supplied by 
generators in standby mode), network losses and maintenance costs are brought 
down, enabling them to postpone new investments and reduce risks of supply 
interruptions. 
For suppliers, these tariffs set a more competitive market environment, with more 
information. Bartusch et al. (2011) also mention the reduction of financial risks of the 
supply activity since the supplier signs a contract with the customer for a given period, 
with fixed prices. 
For society in general, marginal cost pricing can increase electricity market efficiency, 
thus reducing the potential for market power abuses, and reduce environmental 
impacts related to electricity generation and transmission (Bartusch et al., 2011). 
There are several examples of prices depending on the time the service is used. 
Faruqui (2010) mentions prices for car parking, tolls for bridges with traffic 
congestions, flights and hotels, or prices for cultural events and sports or even pricing 
in the telecommunications business. 
Dynamic demand involvement has been promoted with the goal of offering services 
to the power system or reducing overall sector costs. Dupont et al. (2011) present a 
classification of different types of demand response programmes (Figure 1). 
 
          Source: (Dupont et al., 2011) 
Figure 1 – Types of demand response programmes 




Time-of-use (TOU) tariff is a demand response mechanism common in the residential 
customer segment. TOU tariffs have prices variable with time, fixed within time 
blocks known in advance. Although TOU tariffs are usually available, they still are not 
generally applied (Wang and Li, 2011). 
This study on TOU electricity tariffs with smart meters aims to contribute to the 
process of changing the Portuguese electricity market, by looking at new technologies 
in energy measurement. 
 
Time-of-use tariffs considering demand response 
Thanks to smart meters, retail offers can be differentiated in terms of price and 
service, as today, but also in terms of price differentiation through time. Faruqui 
(2010) maintains that each consumer should be able to choose his/her own pricing 
structure, to which he/she can best adapt, among alternative price offers. 
This work considers consumer groups with specific demand profiles and parameters 
for price elasticity of demand, as target groups to the definition of alternative TOU 
tariffs. A tool is proposed to determine the time location of prices and their respective 
values, with the purpose of achieving the demand response potential of each 
consumer group and maintaining fair pricing among all consumers. This tool was 
applied to the case of Portugal, considering the actual network and generation costs, 
specific consumption profiles and overall electricity low voltage demand diagram.  
 
Modelling demand response dynamics 
The Electric Power Research Institute (2008) states that most consumers show price 
responsiveness and that the response level differs from one individual or group to 
another. 
Price elasticity of demand is related to the utility function of electricity consumption. 
In the assumption of a rational use of energy, the consumer will only use energy while 
its cost is below the marginal utility derived from this energy use. Schweppe et al. 
(1988) refer to this assumption in the following way: the rational consumer chooses 
the demand level that maximizes his/her net gain (utility minus cost). 
Demand response to price variations includes readjusting the consumption level, 
changing overall consumption or transferring it between time periods with different 
prices. TOU tariffs aim mainly to transfer consumption, while structural modification 
of demand is promoted through other means, such as incorporating environmental 
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externalities (like the European carbon emission trading scheme) in supply costs or 
promoting consumer information about energy efficiency1. 
In the short term, consumers use technology and behaviour modifications at their 
disposal, in order to adapt demand to price changes. This short-term response is 
limited. When price changes persist, consumers adjust demand through additional 
tools, like investing in more efficient energy using devices (new production 
technologies, appliances or insulation measures in buildings), searching for 
information and training or changing the energy sources used in processes. As a result, 
price elasticity of demand is higher in the long term than in the short term (Electric 
Power Research Institute, 2008). 
Setting TOU tariffs 
A method is proposed and applied to identify peak time and off-peak time periods 
and its prices, using the hourly marginal costs of electricity supply, load profiles of 
demand of significant consumer groups and parameters for price elasticity of their 
demand. The half-hourly profile of marginal cost of supply (Figure 2) is estimated 
from marginal generation cost at wholesale market and incremental costs of using 
the transmission and distribution networks. Brandstatt and Friedrichsen (2012) have 
also referred the importance of using not only generation cost data but also network 
costs in the optimization process. 
 




                                                        
1 This is the case of energy labels for appliances and buildings or information campaigns targeted to 
end-users. 




For generation costs this research considered data on hourly wholesale market day-
ahead prices (publicly available data at the website of the Iberian Electricity Market 
Operator, OMIE), without technical restrictions or ancillary services costs, in the 
Portuguese price area, during 2011. Prices at market referential were adjusted to low 
voltage consumer level through the application of power loss factors published by 
ERSE for 2011. 
For transmission and distribution incremental costs there is no market reference to 
be used. Instead the authors developed a method to estimate half-hourly incremental 
costs based on the regulator’s approved average incremental costs of each tariff 
period (peak, half peak, off-peak and super off-peak) in 2012 and on the 
characterization of the probability of each half hour period belonging to a given tariff 
period. Demand used to calculate the mentioned probability was from a 2005 internal 
study by the regulator on the demand profile at each voltage level. The method here 
described is detailed by Oliveira (2013). 
Three load profiles are used to represent residential consumers and small companies 
in Portugal (A, B, C). The regulatory consumer segments defined for load profiling by 
the regulator and determined by ERSE (2011) were used. Group A corresponds to 
contracted power above 13.8 kVA (medium tertiary companies), Group B to 
contracted power up to 13.8 kVA and annual consumption above 7140 kWh (large 
residential consumers) and Group C to other consumers with contracted power up to 
13.8 kVA (general small residential consumers). Group A accounts for 27% of 
consumption by consumers with contracted power under 41.4 kVA, Group B accounts 
for 3% and Group C makes the other 70%, according to the regulator’s 2012 data. 
These consumers to which demand profiles apply represent 40% of total electricity 
demand. 
Assumptions made by the authors on price elasticity of demand were based on price-
demand elasticity parameters from a review of several papers presenting empirical 
studies. Fan and Hyndman (2011) indicate values between -0.4 and -0.2 for own 
elasticity, while Electric Power Research Institute (2008) mentions -0.6 to -0.2 (and 
0.04 to 0.11 for crossed elasticity). In a study on Spanish consumers, Labandeira, 
Labeaga and López-Otero (2012) pointed to -0.25 to own elasticity and 0.05 for 
crossed elasticity. 
 
Method for determining TOU tariff periods 
The purpose of the method developed is to set tariff time periods, e.g. the 
classification of each hour in the day into tariff price levels, and the determination of 
the price levels which optimize a given objective function. 
The method for determining TOU tariff periods is based on a non-linear optimization 
model with real and binary variables (optimization model). A heuristic is used to 
determine valid (feasible) solutions to the optimization problem. The heuristic has 
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two components that act sequentially: a greedy selection algorithm (which sets 
values for the binary variables) and a procedure to solve a system of non-linear 
equations. Other authors presented alternative methods for determining TOU tariffs 
such as Li et al. (2014) that used clustering of time periods without considering the 
dynamics of demand response. Holtschneider and Erlich (2013) used neural 
networks and an optimization heuristic for TOU determination close to real time. For 
regulators and other public bodies, the transparency of the optimization model 
proposed in the current study, including its constraints, can be considered an 
advantage because it enables stakeholder consultations and involvement. 
As a result from the application of this methodology, TOU tariffs are set for each 
consumer group. 
 
Non-linear optimization model 
A new integer non-linear programming model was developed, for two tariff price 
levels: peak (𝑝1) and off-peak (𝑝2). Considering that the time horizon 𝐻 (1 day) is 
divided in sub periods ℎ  (30 minute periods), the model’s variables are the price 
levels 𝑝1 and 𝑝2, the vector [𝑦ℎ] which associates to each period ℎ a price level 𝑝1 or 
𝑝2 and the demand in each period ℎ represented by 𝑞ℎ. 





∑ (1 − 𝑦ℎ)(𝑞ℎ ∙ 𝑐ℎ − 𝑞ℎ ∙ 𝑝1)ℎ = 0                                                                               (b)
∑ 𝑦ℎ(𝑞ℎ ∙ 𝑐ℎ − 𝑞ℎ ∙ 𝑝2)ℎ = 0                                                                                          (c)
𝑞ℎ = 𝑞ℎ





}𝑗  , 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ ℎ ∈ 𝐻                                         (d)
𝑝1 ∈ [𝑝
0, 𝑝max]                                                                                                                   (e)
𝑝2 ∈ [𝑝min, 𝑝
0]                                                                                                                   (f)
𝑦h ∈ {0,1} , 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ ℎ ∈ 𝐻                                                                                                    (g)
𝑞ℎ ≥ 0, 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ ℎ ∈ 𝐻                                                                                                           (ℎ)
  
 
where the variables are: 
𝑦ℎ    decision variable on the applicable price for period ℎ (0 for 𝑝1 or 1 for 𝑝2) 
𝑝1, 𝑝2    price variables (two time period tariff) 
𝑞ℎ    demand during time period ℎ 
and the parameters are:  
𝑝0 single starting price 





0 demand during time period ℎ with starting price 
𝑐ℎ unit cost of supply during time period ℎ 
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑓 reference cost for starting conditions of demand and price (starting bill) 
𝜀ℎℎ, 𝜀ℎ𝑗  own price-demand elasticity in period ℎ  (𝜀ℎℎ) , crossed between ℎ and 𝑗 
(𝜀ℎ𝑗) 
 
Constraints for price adequacy to cost 
Model constraints (b) and (c) ensure that prices, 𝑝1 and 𝑝2 , are set such that resulting 
revenue is equal to the cost of supply. In the present case, the constraints were used 
so that the social optimum is pursued. However, they can be formulated as inequality 
conditions, namely ensuring that the tariff revenue is at least equal to cost, which 
could be the goal of a single market competitor when setting its prices. 
These constraints, along with (d), impose the non-linearity to the model. Revenue is 
a square function of price, once demand depends linearly on price. 
 
Demand response to price functionality constraint 
Constraint (d) relates demand in each 30 minute time period with the starting 
demand, as a function of own and crossed price-demand elasticities. Own elasticities 
are negative hence demand in period ℎ  decreases when price in the same period 
increases. Crossed elasticities are positive, and consequently demand in period ℎ 
increases when prices in time periods next to ℎ increase, since consumers transfer 
consumption from one period to the next. For the parameters 𝜀ℎ𝑗 in the elasticity 
matrix the following values were used: 
 Own elasticity: base value 𝜀ℎℎ = −0.2 , with a sensitivity analysis in the 
interval [-0.4, -0.1]. 
 Crossed elasticity: base value 𝜀ℎ𝑗 = 0.05 , with a sensitivity analysis in the 
interval [0, 0.1]. It was considered in the central scenario that demand in a 
given period is only influenced by price in the previous and next 2 hours. The 
parameter value set for crossed elasticity corresponds to the sum of all 
contributions from time periods close to ℎ. 
The sensitivity analysis for elasticity values was used to investigate the response of 
the model to different consumer segments with specific consumption patterns. 
Special tariffs can be designed for each consumer group. Another scenario was also 
used to simulate a more complex consumption type, with price-demand elasticity 
varying throughout the day, representing the greater or lesser will to modulate 
consumption according to prices in different times of the day. This scenario was 
called “optimized elasticity”. 
 
 
                        PORTUGUESE JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES, VOL XIX, NO 2, 2014 
67 
 
Price structure constraints 
Constraints (e) and (f) define the price structure, namely that 𝑝1 is higher or equal to 
starting price 𝑝0 (uniform price during the day) and that 𝑝2 is lower or equal to 𝑝
0. It 
also confines prices within the max and min interval corresponding to the limits of 
the marginal cost function. Limits are also used in order to avoid extreme results 
coming from the linear demand function (Faria and Vale, 2011). 
 
Time period classification constraint 
Constraint (g) assigns each time period either to price 𝑝1 or 𝑝2. 
 
Demand variable constraint 
Demand constraint (h) limits demand to a non-negative real number. 
 
Objective function 
The objective function (a) minimizes cost for the supplier and for the customer. If 
market prices reflect marginal costs then the reduction of costs to the end user means 
also reduction of total system costs, as well as environmental impacts. 
A sensitivity analysis was performed on the marginal cost function using two 
alternative sets of marginal costs. 
 
Using a heuristic-based method to solve the problem 
An optimization solver was applied to the model described - Risk Solver Platform 
v11.5, from Frontline Systems, Inc. (Frontline Systems, 2011), running with Microsoft 
Excel 2010. However, due to the model’s structure and dimension of the instances 
tested, the solver did not determine optimal solutions. In fact, it was possible to 
manually find better solutions than the ones found by the solver, hence a heuristic 
was designed and applied to the problem. The heuristic uses a greedy constructive 
algorithm to fix the integer variables and has two major steps: 
 Procedure to solve the non-linear equation system, constraints (b)-(c), 
through a numeric approximation method to determine 𝑝1  and 𝑝2  and the 
value of the objective function. 
 Greedy algorithm to search for a vector [𝑦ℎ] that improves the value of the 
objective function, by changing one component of the vector in each iteration, 
constraint (g). 
The heuristic-based method to solve the non-linear optimization problem makes it 
easy to further impose other constraints on the solution. These constraints can be 
useful, for instance, if one wants to interfere in the time duration of each price block, 
the number of discontinuous price blocks throughout the day or other type of 
requirements. In fact, including these constraints in the model could be quite 




challenging and complex. Hence, the proposed heuristic-based approach gives much 
flexibility to the user of the optimization model.  
 
Results obtained for TOU electricity pricing in Portugal 
As mentioned above, three load profiles were considered (A, B and C), corresponding 
to the three groups used in the Portuguese regulatory regime concerning load profiles 
for tariff setting (ERSE, 2011). The proposed method was applied to setting a two 
price TOU tariff (2 TOU tariff) for all the days in the winter period, as an example. The 
winter period generally includes the yearly peak demand and, correspondingly, the 
greater marginal price differentiation. 
 
Demand profile changes with TOU tariff 
Applying TOU tariffs with two prices (peak and off-peak) results in changes of the 
hourly profile of demand, due to the price elasticity of demand (Figure 3). The 
transfer of consumption is notorious when the peak price is considerably superior to 
off-peak price. In the cases studied, total daily demand was practically invariant. 
 
   
Note: ini demand – initial demand profile; end demand – demand profile when TOU 
tariff is applied; “p.u.” – per unit 
Figure 3 – Impact of TOU tariffs in load profile of demand for load profiles A, B and C 
 
 
Analysis of results expected with TOU tariffs application 
The methodology proposed in this study was applied through simulations performed 
for the different consumer groups, considering the base scenario of demand-price 
elasticity. 
The results all suggested the same time period location for prices at peak (𝑝1) and off-
peak (𝑝2) (Table I). The current 2 TOU tariff has a peak time period between 8:00 and 
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22:00, every day of the year. The time periods that resulted from the application of 
the methodology proposed in this study differ from those currently in place in 
Portugal. The proposed peak price time period is shorter and ends half an hour later 
(Table I). 
 
Table I – TOU tariff time periods for load profiles A, B and C, with base 
scenario of elasticity 
After the simulations using the base scenario of elasticity, a sensitivity analysis was 
performed for different values for price elasticity of demand. Different values for own 
(𝜀𝑖𝑖) and crossed (𝜀𝑖𝑗) demand-price elasticity were considered: higher (high 
scenario) and lower (low scenario) than the base case, as well as an optimized 
elasticity scenario where elasticity values vary along the hours of the day, as 
described in the section where the method is presented. The results showed that 
price period time location is quite insensitive to different scenarios of elasticity (in 
Table II the sensitivity results are presented for the profile C, the most significant 
consumer group). 
 
Table II – Sensitivity analysis to price elasticity in TOU tariff for load profiles C 
 
The proposed methodology calculates an optimal 2 TOU tariff which, in turn, leads 
consumers to change their consumption patterns (demand profile). This demand 
response has consequences either for each responsive consumer or for the electric 
system as a whole. 
The consequences of the application of the TOU tariffs derived from the methodology 
presented can be estimated in terms of variation of consumer bills and maximum 
demand values (the latter is reflected on investment costs in the networks). Three 





p 1 /p 2 Peak TOU
Profile A -16.54 2.35 17:30 - 22:30
Profile B -18.69 2.47 17:30 - 22:30
Profile C -20.01 2.45 17:30 - 22:30
Current 2 TOU tariff 8:00 - 22:00
Notes: p 1 /p 2  - ratio between prices
















p 1 /p 2 Peak TOU
Profile C Base -20.01 -0.2 0.05 2.45 17:30 - 22:30
Profile C High -45.25 -0.4 0.10 2.44 17:30 - 22:30
Profile C Low -12.07 -0.1 0.00 2.45 17:30 - 22:30
Profile C Optimized -24.08 * ** 2.34 18:30 - 23:00
Legend: p 1 /p 2  - TOU price ratio
* -0,4 (6-9h and 21-24h); -0,1 (0-6h and 9-21h)    ** 0,1 (6-9h and 21-24h); 0,025 (0-6h and 9-21h)












Table III presents the main results respecting each consumer group. The table shows 
own (εii) and crossed (εij) elasticity values used in each scenario and indicators on 
anticipated results: the ratio between peak (p1) and off-peak (p2) prices; annual bill 
variation; and the variation of the maximum demand value between 18:00 and 23:00. 
This critical period contains the maximum aggregated demand in low voltage 
networks with 92% of probability, according to an analysis of the aggregated demand 
in the low voltage distribution network. With the data used and the options taken, 
described in this paper, the time location of price periods was very stable across 




Table III – Results expected from applying TOU tariffs 
The results in Table III show a price ratio 𝑝1 𝑝2⁄  between 2.35 and 2.47. This compares 
with a lower ratio in current 2 TOU tariff in Portugal for the year 2012 (ratio of 1.9). 
A higher price ratio corresponds to a greater price differentiation between peak time 
period and off-peak time period. Hence, the time periods for TOU tariff proposed in 
this paper are more effective in carrying price signals to consumers. Li et al. (2014) 
proposed a technique for TOU tariff determination using clustering algorithms which 
looks for reducing within-group dissimilarity in each time block with the same price, 
corresponding to a greater price differentiation between price block. 
Demand response to different prices during the day results in annual bill reductions 
for consumers. Results expected (Table III) account for 1.9% to 8.0% reductions in 
the annual bill (assumed bill includes only the marginal costs of supply used in this 




Scenario p 1/p 2 [EUR/year] [%]
Base -0.2 0.05 2.35 -16.54 -3.1% -12.5%
High -0.4 0.10 2.35 -36.73 -7.0% -18.7%
Low -0.1 0.00 2.35 -10.06 -1.9% -7.5%
Base -0.2 0.05 2.47 -18.69 -3.5% 1.6%
High -0.4 0.10 2.46 -41.32 -7.8% 8.0%
Low -0.1 0.00 2.47 -11.43 -2.2% -2.2%
Base -0.2 0.05 2.45 -20.01 -3.5% -5.2%
High -0.4 0.10 2.44 -45.25 -8.0% 1.1%
Low -0.1 0.00 2.45 -12.07 -2.1% -6.8%
Group C
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responsiveness of the consumer to the different elasticity scenarios rather than the 
different consumer groups. The effects on the bill simulated for the three different 
consumer groups are quite invariant for each elasticity scenario: from -1.9% (Group 
A) to -2.2% (Group B) with low elasticity and from -7.0% (Group A) to -8.0% (Group 
C) with high elasticity. 
Finally, in order to measure changes to the hourly load profile of demand resulting 
from TOU tariffs, the expected variation in the maximum value of demand inside the 
18:00-23:00 time window was estimated. In the simulated cases, the reduction of 
maximum demand in the critical period reached 18.7% (Table III). However, the 
results for the three consumer groups are quite distinct. For example, while Group A 
can reduce maximum demand in the time window 18:00-23:00 for 18.7% (with high 
elasticity), Group B increases the demand in the same period about 8% (and Group C 
demand increases 1.1%). 
Considering the base scenario of elasticity values, the proposed TOU tariff results in 
an estimated variation in peak demand between +1.6% and -12.5%. These figures are 
in accordance with results of other studies, such as those of Faruqui and Sergici 
(2010), which mention an average 4% decrease in peak demand by consumers in 
several TOU tariff pilot projects.  
 
Conclusion 
This study proposes a method to set electricity TOU tariff time periods for small size 
low voltage consumers (residential and companies). The adoption of smart meters, 
thus enabling consumption registration and consumer interaction far beyond current 
standards, will permit the promotion of demand response through electricity pricing. 
Electricity supply costs vary in time and are bound by aggregated demand. Tariffs set 
by regulators or by market suppliers should reflect these costs, allocating them to the 
consumers that cause them, and should convey price signals that promote a correct 
response from demand. 
The method proposed is based on information about the hourly marginal cost of 
supply, the load profile of demand of certain consumer groups and their respective 
parameters for demand-price elasticity. 
From the scenarios studied, the application of TOU tariffs with two prices resulted in 
a reduction in the annual bill of consumers between 2% and 8% (mostly due to 
different price-demand elasticities), besides a reduction in the maximum demand in 
the critical period of up to 18.7% (for one consumer group). All consumer groups 
simulated showed a similar potential for reducing bills when applying such a TOU 
tariff. In other dimensions, such as changing the maximum demand in the 18:00-
23:00 time window, the three consumer groups presented very different results 
(from an 18.7% decrease in maximum demand in Group A to an 8% increase in Group 
B). This can mean that for certain objectives to be achieved, network operators or 




public bodies should target specific consumer groups for applying TOU tariffs. This is 
also true for the geographical dimension of the problem.  
These figures show that both consumers and network operators stand to gain with 
added efficiency brought about by this type of tariff. It also points to the relevance of 
enabling demand responsiveness. Different forms of promoting consumer 
responsiveness levels can coexist and can be delivered in the energy services market. 
Together with a cost reflective TOU differentiated electricity tariff this can deliver 
value to consumers and to the power sector alike. 
TOU pricing should be accompanied by complimentary measures facilitating demand 
response. Electronic devices such as in-house displays are examples of tools for 
marketing price and consumption information to consumers. TOU tariffs can play an 
important role in the electricity system in order to cope with electric vehicles 
charging, which can follow TOU tariff price incentives to minimize network 
reinforcement costs (Brandstatt and Friedrichsen, 2012). 
The method and the results obtained in this study could support the setting of time 
location of TOU prices by market players (regulators, suppliers, network operators). 
The method is also useful to assess the estimated benefits obtained by consumers and 
by the electricity sector as a whole, as a result of different pricing options, since the 
dynamics of price responsiveness of demand are considered. 
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